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Asked  what  we  should  do  about  inflation,  economists  give  a lot
of  different  answers.  Some  economists  say  government  is  the  sole
source;  responsibility  for  inflation  resides  in Washington.  Some  say
the  real  source  is  federal  budget deficits.  Others  say  that monetary
policy alone  is  the cause  of inflation.  I think monetary expansion is
the  fundamental  underlying  cause.  Some  also  say  that  the  causes
of inflation  are  social, with  all  groups  continually  trying to increase
their share  of the  pie; this can't be realized,  so we have inflation as a
result.
One  might  ask "what  does the public  make  of this?".  If you ask
them,  "Should  we  impose  mandatory  wage  and  price  controls?",
more  than  one-half  say  "yes."  That's an interesting  phenomenon.  It
usually  rises to more than one-half when we have  increasing inflation,
but we  do  need to recognize  that it's very  seldom  very  much below
50 percent of the public.
Maybe  such  a  response  is  simply  an  indication  that  what  they
really want  is somebody to "do  something".  Maybe it's an indication
that  they want the government  to take  some  action  that will  be  ef-
fective  in  reducing  inflation.  But  it's  also  possible  that  they  have
certain  views  about  the  way  the  economy  works.  These  views lead
them  to  think  mandatory  wage  and  price  controls  might be  a good
answer.
Reasoning About Inflation
Now,  what  I want to do is to sketch some of the lines of reasoning
that  often  appear  in  news  commentary  and  columnists'  articles  on
the  question  that  may  be  in  the  minds  of the general  public  when
people  are  interviewed  and  asked  about  the  causes  of  inflation.  I
want  to do this,  because  I think these  are  important  in understand-
ing  why,  whatever  we  economists  may  think,  the  public  so  often
seems  favorably  inclined  toward  wage  and  price controls, even when
inflation is not all that much of a problem.
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The  first line of reasoning  that's often given is that the kind of in-
flation  that  we  are  experiencing  now  is  a new phenomenon.  There
are  "special  factors"  that  weren't  there  before  and that inflation-
rather  than  being  some  kinds  of  systematic  phenomena,  say  asso-
ciated  with  money  supply  growth-is  the  result  of  certain  specific
problems  at the present time.
Take  food  for example.  Food  supplies  are heavily  influenced  by
bad  weather  here or there.  This  was an important factor in 1972-73.
There  also  are  cycles  at  work,  particularly  in  the  case  of beef and
pork.  The  point  is  usually  made  that  the  management  of demand,
monetary  policy,  or  any  general  government  policy  can't be effec-
tive when  things like  weather  or the beef cycle  are  the real cause of
the problem.
Another  often  mentioned  area  as  a "special  factor"  lying behind
our  inflation  is  energy.  Now that we  have  OPEC involved  in world
oil  pricing,  it is  said  that oil prices are set by a group  of Arab sheiks,
and  they essentially  specify  what price  it is that we, the oil consum-
ing  countries,  have  to pay.  What  is  often  forgotten  is the fact that,
in the recent past, oil prices set on the open market and in short term
contracts  were  higher,  and  OPEC  pricing  tended  to  follow  that-
suggesting  maybe  supply  and  demand  are relevant  there,  too. But in
any  event,  there  is  an  element  of validity  in  the argument  that we
face a very new world oil pricing situation.
Another  "special  factor"  that's  often  mentioned  is  health  care,
which  is  increasingly  important  these  days  in  terms of the fraction
of  GNP  that  it  accounts  for.  Health  cost  inflation,  it's  often  said,
occurs  because  the  market  doesn't  really  function  well.  After  all,
who  shops  around  for  the  lowest  price  at  which  he  can  get  some
sort  of  emergency  surgery  performed?  There  is  no  time  or inclina-
tion  for  that.  Who  would  even  care,  as  a matter of fact,  so  long  as
the  insurance  company  is  paying  the  bill?  So  in this  situation, the
doctor tells you what to  buy, and  he indicates what you should  pay
for it.  Experts choose  what it is you need. Third parties pay the bill.
Therefore,  it's said,  the market  functions  poorly  and  we need some-
thing  to  combat  that  newly  emerging  situation-health  care  cost
inflation.
Another  item  that's  often  mentioned  these  days,  is  housing.  It's
said  that  rapidly  rising  housing  prices  lead  to speculation.  Specula-
tion  drives  up  the  prices  of  existing  houses,  and  that  by itself  of
course,  doesn't  do  anything  to  increase  the  housing  stock.  It's the
prices of new houses that are most relevant for that. So it's said that
speculation is an important factor in rising housing prices.
I  suppose  we  ought  to  notice  in  this  connection  that  windfall
profits  taxes  have  been  proposed  in  the  case  of  old  oil,  the  logic
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farmland that has been there  even  longer.  Blaming "special  factors"
is,  of  course,  something  that  has  a  long  history  behind  it.  People
have attributed inflation to special factors for a long time.
Wage-Price  Spiral
The  second  line  of  reasoning  is  different,  in  that  it  says  infla-
tion is an old phenomenon.  What is involved here is a notion that we
have  a spiral  of some  sort that is supported  by rigidities  in the mar-
ketplace  such  as the exercise  of market  power. It's sometimes called
the wage-price  spiral,  it's sometimes  called  the wage-wage  spiral,  it's
sometimes  even  called  a price-price  spiral.  But the notion  is that it's
self-perpetuating,  and that  it's  self-perpetuating  in  a  large  part  be-
cause  of the  exercise  of market power  on the wage  side or the price
side.
Let's  look  at  the  wage  side for a minute.  The wage  side  is really
the  essential  ingredient  in  cost-push  theory.  The  idea  is that  costs
are  pushing  up  prices.  So  it  looks  like cost-push  to every  business-
man  who  finds  his  cost  rising,  even  though  he  willingly  may  pay
the  increased  cost.  In  that  context,  union  power  is  often  viewed
as  an important factor.  The notion is that wages rise no matter what
current  market  conditions  are like  and there are,  of course, institu-
tional reasons  why this  may  be the case.  Unions  are often governed
by long term contracts,  their wages  are  set under long term arrange-
ments.  It's  not  surprising  that  when  a  different  union  contract
with a different  expiration date comes up for negotiation, one of the
arguments  about  why  they  merit  a  wage  increase  of  a  particular
size  is  that  another  union  with  a  continuing,  existing  contract  is
getting wage increases of a particular size.
So  the  combination  of long-term  contracts  and  some  exercise  of
market  power,  tends  to insulate  the labor  market-some  portion  of
the labor market at least-from  current  market conditions.  Now, we
may ask,  what is the evidence on this? Have wage increases responded
to  economic  conditions  at all or not? Let me  give  you some  overly
simplistic  evidence  that sometimes suggests that cost-push from wage
increases is a major factor in inflation.
Over the  past 10 years or so, hourly earnings have increased about
7%  annually  on  average.  In addition to that, the average absolute de-
viation  from  the  7%  was  3/10  of  one  percent.  That's  a very small
deviation.  That  excludes,  of  course,  1974,  when  prices  were  rising
at a 12 percent rate. Then wages rose at 21/2% percentage points more
than  7%.  If  you  look at the present time,  when  the inflation  is be-
tween  12% and  15%,  we find somewhat surprisingly the rate of wage
increase  on  the  order  of  7/2%.  Superficially  at  least, that seems to
suggest  that  there's  a  degree  of  stability  in  hourly  labor  cost  in-
creases  that's  independent  of  market  forces.  After  all,  the  rate  of
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The  unemployment  rate varied between  31/2%  and 81/2%.  So there was
a  great  variation  in  economic  conditions  during  a  period  of remark-
able stability in the average rate of hourly wage increase.
On the price  side, market concentration  is often pointed out to be
the problem.  The fact that there are  firms with a large  share of indus-
try  output  leads  to  oligopoly  pricing  under  price  leadership  or
whatever  form  you  want  to  subscribe  to.  The  industries  that  are
singled  out in  this connection  are  usually steel and sometimes autos.
Recently  oil  has been  singled out as one. Now for food, interestingly
the finger  has  been  pointed  at the middleman.  Whether  he  is a food
processor  or  retailer,  and  whatever  his  profit  margins,  the  finger
tends  to  be  pointed  at  the  middleman  in  the  case  of food  pricing.
It  is  true,  of  course,  that prices  in relatively  concentrated  indus-
tries  tend  to  be  more  stable than, for example,  farm product  prices
at  the  farm  level.  They  increase  by  less  during  a  period  of expan-
sion,  however,  as  well  as  decreasing by less when there is a recession.
There  is  more stability over the cycle, and not necessarily a tendency
for these prices to rise relative to other prices. In fact, when you look
at the data you find that prices in concentrated  industry tend to rise
less on average.
Underlying Pressures
The  third  line  of reasoning  is  quite  orthodox,  really,  in  that  it
says  monetary  expansion  is  important.  The  question  is,  however,
why  do  we  have  excessive  money  creation?  Why  do  we  continue  to
print  more  money  than  would  be  consistent  with  stable  prices  if
that's the basic  cause  of inflation?  One  answer that's given by those
who  have  favored  wage  and  price  controls  is that wage-price  trends
have  their  own  momentum.  They  rise  from  the  circumstances  just
described  or  other  mechanisms  that  people  might  have  in  mind.
Rising wage  and  price  trends  will  at least initially be accompanied
by  higher  unemployment  as  a result of crimping down  on the rate of
monetary  expansion.  So unless  monetary expansion is proportionate
to  the  momentum  that has  been  established,  from  somewhere,  you
will  have  for  a  period  of  time  underutilized  resources.  This  is,  of
course,  politically  awkward.  It's  an  economist's  lag,  but it's a  poli-
tician's  nightmare.  Accordingly  there  are  strong  pressures  on  the
Federal  Reserve  Board,  irrespective  of  whatever  independence  it
may  have institutionally,  to try to make  an accommodation.  It may
try to cut back  a bit on the rate of monetary  expansion,  but it will
accommodate,  to  some  extent,  existing  trends  and  new  develop-
ments such as oil price increases.
Some  people  feel  that  mandatory  controls  can  perform  a  role
here  by  reducing  actual  wage  and  price  increases  for  a time.  They
may  even reduce  expectations  of inflation,  if people  believe that the
mandatory  controls  are  effective.  Now  this  argument  tends to work
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a  while.  Because  people  tend to remember,  if it happened recently,
that  the  rate  of  inflation  when  controls  were  over  was  worse than
when  the  controls  were  imposed.  Thus, it's an argument  that needs
to  be  used  sparingly,  with  sufficient  time  for  memories  of  past
episodes to erode somewhat.
There  is  no  real  mystery  about  why  it  is  that expectations  that
wage  and price controls would do something to reduce inflation tend
to  be  frustrated.  In  policy  decisions  there  are  always  lots  of com-
peting  goals  and  purposes.  There  is  a tremendous  temptation  when
one has mandatory  wage and price controls to indulge in policies that
would  over  time  be  inflationary,  but  which  one  wouldn't  dare  to
pursue in the absence of the controls.
I  recall  during the period  when  we had mandatory  wage and price
controls  in the early  1970s that there  was often  a drift  in the meet-
ings  of  the  Cost of Living  Council.  At  the beginning  every  member
affirmed  the truth that we  should  not let mandatory  wage and price
controls  be  an  excuse  for over-expansion.  By the end of the meeting
the  discussion  tended  to  drift  away  from  that toward  some  of the
things that it would  be tempting, useful, and pleasant to do; after all
we  had wage  and price  controls  which  would  help  to curb whatever
inflationary  consequences might result. That is  a tremendous tempta-
tion.
Indeed,  to some  extent policymakers  have a less sensitive guide to
what,  in  fact,  is  going  on,  when  wage  and  price  controls  are
enforced.  It's very  difficult  to discover or determine, what's building
up  behind  the dam.  The situation  is far more  apparent  when  prices
are free to rise.
Now  another  answer  to  the  question  of  why  is  there  too much
money  expansion  comes  from  the credit  market  side. That is to say,
people  give  emphasis  in their  explanation  to federal  budget deficits.
Financing  federal  budget  deficits  means  that  borrowing  needs  to
occur  from  somewhere  in  order  to  finance  the  deficit,  or money
needs to be printed  by the Federal  Reserve  in  excess of what is bor-
rowed,  in  order  to finance  the deficit.  If deficits are large, and there
is pressure  from  private  borrowing,  it's easy to see the temptation to
raise monetary  expansion  a bit above what would be consistent with
price  stability  in  order  to  make  room  for a bit of extra borrowing
and to avoid  large  increases  in the interest rate. It is thus, an indirect
route that people give emphasis to when they point to the credit side
of the cause of monetary  expansion.
Another  dilemma here  is that if we  let inflation rise, then there is
pressure  for more  government  spending,  and  perhaps larger deficits,
in  order  to  do  things for the poor that we would want to do  given
the  impact  of  inflation  on  their  level  of  living.  If  instead  we  say
we  are  going  to  have  a  stringent  monetary  policy  and  we  have  a
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the  size  of  the  deficit,  both  through  reduced  receipts  and  through
higher expenditures  for programs  like unemployment compensation.
So  that line of reasoning has suggested to many that what we need to
do  is  avoid  both the recession  and the inflation, and have mandatory
wage  and price  controls.  This  will  help  to avoid inflationary circum-
stances leading to excess money creation in the economy.
Resource  Underutilization
The  fourth  line  of  reasoning  is  essentially  that  we  should  avoid
worrying  too  much  as  economists  about  market  efficiency,  about
economic  efficiency.  What  we  should  worry  more  about instead  is
underutilization  of resources.  We  should  worry  more about the kind
of  waste  that  is  presumed  to come  from operating  the economy  at
less  than full capacity.  We  should  worry less about distortions in the
economy  and  inefficiencies  in  the  economy  that  may  result  from
wage  and  price  controls.  Under  stringent  controls  these  usually
become  quite  evident.  After  all,  according  to  this  reasoning,  we
shouldn't  regard  ourselves  as having a freely competitive  market any-
way.  A  little  bit  of  "informal  controls"  probably  wouldn't  impede
the competitive process all that much.
One  can  point to things like the kind  of economic regulation  we
have  for  trucking,  for  airlines  (until  recently),  for railroads,  barges,
for  electric  utilities,  for  natural  gas,  now  for  petroleum,  for  pipe-
lines  and  for  other  utility  bills  that  people  pay.  All  of these  areas
are  subject to price  regulation.  In addition,  of course,  we have price
supports for many  farm  products,  such  as grains, milk, sugar, and so
on.  In  addition,  we  also  support  prices  in  indirect  ways  by import
limitation.  We  have  trigger  prices  for  steel,  voluntary  arrangements
for textiles,  shoes, and TV sets. And we have explicit import arrange-
ments  for  cheese,  beef,  and non-fat  dried  milk.  Now,  of course,  we
also have in the offing a limitation on crude oil imports.
In  addition  to  these  forms  of  price  regulation,  we often  tell our
firms  a  great  deal  about  how they should go about producing things,
even  what  kinds  of  things  to produce.  It's often  said,  for example,
that  automobiles,  by  and  large,  are  designed  in  Washington  not in
Detroit.  NHTSA tells  them  what the safety  standards  are,  EPA tells
them  what  kind  of pollution standards  they  need to meet,  and  the
Congress tells  them what their  mileage  standards  on average need to
be  (which  essentially translates  itself into the weight  and  size  of the
automobile).  In that  sense,  it's not  consumer  sovereignty  so  much
as  government  regulation  that  determines  the  character  of  the
products that we buy.
In  addition  to that,  government  tells firms a great deal about how
to  go  about  producing  such  products.  OSHA,  for  example,  has
been  the  subject  of  some  ridicule  directed  to  its health  and  safety
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the form  of toilet seats. The number of hospital beds is subject to re-
view  by states  or other organizations.  The number of CAT  scanners
and  open  heart  surgery  centers  and  so  on  are  subject to review  by
professionals  concerned  with  these  matters.  Hospital  cost  contain-
ment  legislation  is  being  considered  in the Congress  and,  of course,
the administration  has supported it.
I mention  all  of these  areas,  because they are  often brought  for-
ward in  a line of reasoning that says since so much of the economy is
already  subject to  so much regulation,  why not remove this last irri-
tant of inflation  and bring it all subject to price regulation,  and have
mandatory  controls.  That way we  wouldn't  have to worry about in-
flation anymore.
Legal Fairness
A  fifth  line  of  reasoning  is  from  a  legal  perspective  essentially.
We  now  have,  and  we  have  had in the past on various  occasions,  a
so-called  voluntary  scheme-guidelines  or standards. Now one view is
that  mandatory  controls  would  at  least  be  more  fair  under  some
definitions  of  fairness.  The  AFL-CIO  has  taken  a position  favoring
mandatory  controls  rather  than  the  voluntary  guidelines  we  now
have.  There  is something unfair about  these voluntary  guidelines,  of
course.  One  thing  is  that  the  non-volunteer,  those  who  choose  not
to  volunteer,  stand to  gain.  Those  who  do volunteer,  on the other
hand,  tend  to  lose.  Now  economists  who  tend to emphasize  maxi-
mizing  decisions regard that as  an anomalous  framework,  and every-
body else probably thinks it's sort of unfair.
There  is  also the  matter of legal  fairness.  That  is to  say, a volun-
tary  scheme  tends to be backed up by coercion, and coercive powers
that  aren't  granted  through  the passage  of legislation  are not really
consistent  with the kind of government we have. Unless action taken
by  government  is  authorized  by  legislation,  we  regard  government
actions  as  essentially  out-of-bounds.  One  thing  this  means  is  that
when a citizen  feels  that he is being harmed by government action in
this quasi-voluntary  area, he has no recourse.
He  can't take someone  to court for something  which is not really
based  on  any  legal  processes  in  the  first  place.  Instead  actions  are
based  on broader,  political  considerations  and  based  on the amount
of leverage  that the government  has in a particular case. The "legal"
case  for mandatory  controls  is that  it  would  make  these  so-called
voluntary guidelines  that we  often have  in the  economy legal. If the
government  feels that it is  able to specify what every wage and price
increase  should  be,  then it might  as well  make the controls  manda-
tory and thus more effective.
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I've  sketched  out  what  I  think are  five  general  lines  of reasoning
that  are  often pointed out to make  a  case for support of mandatory
wage  and price  controls.  These  are:  First,  the "special factors"  argu-
ment.  Second, the  wage-price  spiral  arguments.  Third,  the view that
there  are  political  and economic  factors  underlying  excessive  mone-
tary  expansion.  Fourth,  there  is  the  view  that  we  ought  to  worry
less  about  market  efficiency  and  more  about  getting  closer  to  the
potential  output  of  the  economy.  Fifth,  there  is  the  legal  fairness
case.
Now  most of these,  as you will  notice,  really  describe  some facet
of what  is  going  on.  They  don't  really  address  themselves  to what
the  underlying  causes  of inflation are, but recounting these processes
does  suggest  to  people  that these  descriptions  may  themselves  con-
stitute something of a causal explanation.
Having  sketched  out  these  lines  of  reasoning,  we  should  ask;
will  mandatory  wage  and  price  controls  work?  The answer  to that
question  would  seem  to most reasonable  people  to be either  yes  or
no.  Economists,  of  course,  tend  to  answer  questions like  that  by
saying  "that  depends".  Well  what  does  it depend  on?  We  can  look
back at a  couple  of years  during World  War  II, when wage and price
controls  really  did  keep  the  overall  price  level  quite  stable.  There
was  some  quality  deterioration,  certainly,  but  generally  speaking
wages  and  prices  were  quite  stable.  This,  of  course,  was  a  period
in which we had rationing coupons for a number of commodities. We
had lines,  we  had  black  markets,  and  we  had  a very  big bureaucracy
trying to police the system. What's probably  more important though,
is  that  our  attention  wasn't  mainly  focused  on  economic  matters
at  all.  It was  mainly  focused  on what  was  regarded  as  an  overriding
consideration,  winning  World  War  II.  I  think  this  is  an  important
factor that made us willing to overlook many of the inefficiencies.
There  is  one  thing  that  economists  can  say  for sure-one  of the
few  things  they  can  be  certain  about-and  that  is that if you hold
prices at  ceilings that  are  below  market clearing levels you are surely
going  to  have  shortages.  People  tend  to  appreciate  that fact better
when  actual  shortages  occur  and  give  them some  experience,  but it
certainly  is  a  well  demonstrated  fact.  Shortages  are  one  way  of ac-
complishing allocation.  That is,  one way to allocate resources  of vari-
ous  kinds  of goods  and  services  is  by letting lines  build  up. We  saw
a  certain  amount  of that during the  past summer in the  case  of gas
lines.  We  tend to be  very  irritated  by standing in lines and by having
goods  unavailable,  but  I  should  say  that  across  the  world,  really
in  most  societies  and  most  economies,  it's  quite  a  common  phe-
nomenon.
In  the  Eastern  European  economies,  in  the  Soviet  economy,
lines  are  extremely  common  and perform  a role  in allocating  goods
42that  are  available.  It  is  a way  of  allocating  them  that's  a  feasible
alternative  to  using  prices.  If  we  as  a  society  prefer  that  way  of
allocating  resources,  that  is  a  possibility.  We  need,  however,  to
recognize  that  we  can't  have  both an  absence  of lines or allocation
systems  and binding wage and price controls.
I  suppose  another  question  to  ask  in  connection  with  wage  and
price  controls  and  the  case  for them  is;  will  other policies  work?
Here  I  think  if  one looks  at previous history,  episodes  of inflation,
episodes  of  falling  prices,  episodes  of  price  instability,  the  answer
is  clear  that  responsible,  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  will  work.
They  will  be  effective.  But there is another way to pose the question
as well.  That is, will  it  be possible to  persist with responsible mone-
tary  and  fiscal  policies  and  in  that  process  avoid  turning  to  wage
and  price controls,  or will  there  be  a political reaction  generated by
disappointed  expectations,  by  rigidities  that  at least  initially,  lead
to  a  period  of  higher  unemployment  than  might  otherwise  occur?
Will persistence be politically  possible?
I  think  that  this  will  depend  to  a  large  degree  on  what  the  na-
ture  of public  understanding  is  about the economy  and  about what
role  wage  and price controls  could  play.  I  suggest that there  are two
ways  in  which  public  understanding  about  that  will  be  generated.
One  way  is  if  economists  and  others  who  do  analysis  and  commu-
nicate  are  able  to  somehow  address  the  five  or more  rationales  for
wage  and  price  controls,  show  where  there  are  flaws  and  why they
are  fallacious, and point out what the upshot of mandatory  wage and
price  control  would  be.  The  other  way  in  which  public  opinion
will  determine  whether  wage  and  price  controls  are taken  seriously
as  a proposed  solution  is  that we  will  again  have  an experience  with
another  failure  of  the controls  themselves  that will change  people's
views.
I think we need to recognize that any policy to be successful  needs
to  command  a certain  amount of consensus  based  on  public  under-
standing of what is at issue and what the consequences  of alternatives
are.  At the present time the public seems not be convinced that wage
and  price  controls  are  undesirable  and  ineffective.  I  suppose  any
consensus  that would  be formed  would  be likely  to be  a shaky one.
Probably  it  should  be  labeled  "use  well  before  shaking"  instead  of
"shake  well  before  using".  Because  it would  surely  take  a period  of
time  in  which  there  would  be  significant  strains that would  be.ex-
perienced  under  policies to reduce rates of inflation in a process that
leads toward more price stability.
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